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Since his inauguration in 2009, President Barack Obama has emphasized his administration’s 
commitment to improving public knowledge about what government does. On his first day in 
office, Obama signed a “Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government,” which set the 
course for a series of executive orders requiring federal agencies to make “open and machine 
readable data” a default policy.  These efforts culminated in data.gov, an online repository for 
government-collected information (Obama 2009).  
Policy ideas like transparency and openness have long been identified with the goal of 
holding democratic governments (and sometimes the private sector) responsible (Shils 1956; 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2770630 
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Rourke 1961). Yet beyond mere accountability, Obama’s rhetoric suggests that data and 
transparency can be positive instruments of public policy—a means of shaping social and 
economic behavior that differs qualitatively from fiscal incentives or regulatory punishments. As 
his 2013 Executive Order puts it, “making information resources easy to find, accessible, and 
usable can fuel entrepreneurship, innovation, and scientific discovery that improves Americans’ 
lives and contributes significantly to job creation” (Obama 2013).  
In the past year, the administration has begun to put its data initiatives to use—not only to 
monitor the performance of federal agencies, but also to alter policy debates in a variety of 
arenas. The Department of Education launched a College Scorecard, which will allow consumers 
to evaluate colleges and universities that receive federal funds with new metrics that evaluate 
affordability and labor-market outcomes (Turner 2015). The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services have also imposed new transparency requirements on doctors. They require the 
publication of consumer information on, among other things, “how reliably physicians provide 
follow-up care for depression and high blood pressure, and how well they monitor patients for 
healthy weight and tobacco use” (Evans 2015).  
Such initiatives are animated by the idea that the state can leverage public knowledge as 
an instrument of public policy. Rather than directly prohibiting or incentivizing certain behaviors 
on the part of government officials or market actors, however, transparency programs work 
indirectly. The hope of transparency advocates is that information will either enable democratic 
publics (or government watchdogs) to mobilize behind new policies or permit consumers to 
(privately) alter their choices about consumption in the market.  
Yet transparency programs have their classical downsides. As Francis Rourke put it in 
1961, “there is no simple way of reconciling the conflicting claims of publicity, secrecy, and 
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democracy” (Rourke 1961: 226). Rather, as the books under review here suggest, transparency 
carries with it a distinctive politics. Given their symbolic value, “Open Government” initiatives 
are easy enough to enact. Yet in practice, such reforms contend with the entrenched incentives 
and habits of three vital sets of actors: the targets of transparency reforms themselves; 
government officials charged with deploying and implementing the tools of transparency; and 
the public audiences that these policies are intended to inform. Often, transparency programs fail 
to reshape how these actors behave, and hence fail to ignite meaningful changes in the direction 
or scope of public policy. In some cases, policymakers have also developed powerful new tools 
to restrict the flow of information, which remain outside the purview of sunshine laws altogether. 
 
ENFORCING SUNSHINE    
A core presumption of transparency advocates is that government programs can compel the 
production of information that is accurate, up-to-date, and focused on the appropriate empirical 
phenomena for the governing task at hand. However, were food manufacturers—to take one 
example—able to evade packaging requirements by giving new names to unsafe ingredients, it is 
doubtful that transparency would enable informed consumer choices. To work properly, 
freedom-of-information laws must make it difficult for government agencies or market actors to 
claim exemptions or invent new categories of private information. Otherwise, the information 
legislators or citizens can procure is unlikely to enable them to observe the behaviors such 
reforms seek to guard against, let alone influence policy.   
Jason Ross Arnold’s Secrecy in the Sunshine Era is the definitive account of why 
enforcing sunshine laws has proven to be so difficult. As Arnold argues, open government laws 
like the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), and 
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the Public Records Act are politically popular, and are often enacted by broad majorities. 
Nevertheless, these laws do little to change the culture of the officials they were designed to 
police. And since those officials are the ones with material possession of the files themselves, 
their beliefs and preferences matter. Among Executive Branch officials, a “governing ideology” 
that emphasized the value of secrecy for making good public policy persisted even after sunshine 
laws were passed. This ideology was arguably most pronounced during the Bush-Cheney 
administration, whose officials often articulated a “strong version of the unitary executive 
theory,” in which the President’s unique constitutional authority in matters of foreign policy 
allowed it to share information with Congress and the public on a strictly voluntary basis (41).  
Even in the absence of a clearly articulated ideology, sunshine laws give the Executive 
Branch ample opportunities for circumvention. Presidents can take advantage of economic or 
national security crises as “unsettled times,” rhetorically constructing broader public support for 
secrecy. But rather than pressing for the retrenchment of open government laws, presidents have 
layered on new policies—such as the Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002—that create 
novel categories of protected information, limiting the scope of existing policies. Presidents have 
developed legal rationales for defending secrecy in the courts, gradually converting the meaning 
of existing laws. Several administrations have been successful in protecting the privacy of 
presidential task forces, for instance, by arguing that their members were in fact “guests” and 
“visitors,” and hence not subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act.  
The failure of sunshine laws to achieve institutional “lock in” has allowed excessive 
secrecy to persist, restricting public involvement in the policymaking process. As Arnold 
documents, all post-FOIA presidential administrations have found ways of exempting 
themselves from the law. Between 1998 and 2008, the rate of fully granted FOIA requests fell by 
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roughly half. The percent of meetings by FACA-covered government organizations that were 
closed to the public increased from 20 percent in 1974 to well over 60 percent in 2004. This 
secrecy has helped to shroud more than foreign policy decisions where Executive Branch 
dominance is to be assumed; indeed, Arnold demonstrates that secrecy continues to pervade 
domestic policy, such as the White House muffling of scientific findings on climate change, 
regulatory information about industrial pollution and the identity of businesses selling 
contaminated meat.  
While Executive Branch secrecy has been a persistent trend in the “Sunshine Era,” the 
rise of a stronger variant of unitary executive theory in the White House has also led to a marked 
increase in some forms of circumvention.  Since the Bush-Cheney administration, Arnold shows, 
there has been a shift in how officials at the White House Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) have 
circumvented FOIA requirements to promptly publish “statements of policy and interpretations 
which have been adopted.” Under Bush-Cheney, the vast majority of OLC’s opinions were 
published four or more years after they were enacted.  
While Arnold argues that comparisons across successive presidential administrations are 
difficult to carry out, he effectively shows that the Obama administration’s Open Government 
initiatives are meaningfully different than the efforts of past administrations, even if they have 
not contributed to a shift in the overall direction of policy. In particular, he details the 
administration’s efforts at changing the rules on FACA and FOIA, as well as the rollout of more 
concrete transparency guidelines across agencies that control access to proprietary scientific 
information. These measures have had promising early-stage consequences. Yet as suggested by 
recent revelations of excessive Executive Branch secrecy about the National Security 
Administration’s wiretapping program, the culture of secrecy is baked into the day-to-day 
6 
 
routines of some federal agencies. This raises the bar that any single reform will have to clear in 
order to be considered a success.  
 Arnold’s analysis forces us to consider a pragmatic question about transparency reforms: 
given the political consensus about “open government” as a tool for enhancing policy 
responsiveness in a democracy, why do such efforts often fail? The problem is that, while 
transparency programs mobilize constituencies from journalists to entrepreneurial watchdogs 
across the political spectrum, they often do little to alter the powerful incentives government 
officials have to protect information that allows them to shape the course of policy in a 
fragmented political system. If it is true that the preferences of bureaucratic agents—rather than 
legislative principals—are to blame, the search for “sunshine” cannot be limited to transparency 
policies alone. Indeed, Arnold’s work suggests that a response to agents’ entrenched preferences 
for secrecy—possibly in the process of recruitment, retention, and promotion—may be an 
important complementary reform.  
 
COMBATING VISION LOSS  
Of course, obstreperous officials are not solely responsible for ineffective transparency 
programs. While the idea of “open government” appears natural and spontaneous, an “original 
condition” of democratic societies, it does not happen in the absence of “boots on the ground.” In 
practice, this means existence of a “monitor” who can not only compel the release of information 
to the public, but also translate “raw” data about action in government or the marketplace into 
meaningful public knowledge.1 Monitors thus must know which information to procure, when to 
procure it, and how to ensure that its dissemination changes behavior, either through markets or 
                                                            
1 On the weakness of “raw” data as a concept, see Gitelman (2013).  
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politics. Gaining such knowledge, much less using it, requires substantial investment by 
legislative or regulatory principals. Yet these actors will be unlikely to make such efforts unless 
activities such as bureaucratic oversight and consumer protection allow them to build 
professional and political reputations.  
 There is a mountain of evidence on this point tucked within Watchdogs on the Hill, Linda 
Fowler’s succinct yet probing study of the decline of congressional oversight of US foreign 
relations. In a carefully designed analysis that blends case studies with an explosion of original 
quantitative data, Fowler reveals how variations in partisan, professional, and institutional 
incentives led to significant gaps in the Senate’s capacity to effectively keep a “watchful eye” on 
executive-led foreign policy initiatives. To explain declining Senate oversight, Fowler shows 
how shifting expectations of senators’ allocation of time weakened their ability to become 
foreign policy specialists and how media attention to the Senate Armed Services and Foreign 
Relations committees decreased. These gradual institutional shifts helped to dampen members’ 
incentives to routinely monitor executive branch activity on military interventions and 
diplomatic relations. Given the vast and expanding nature of the Executive Branch’s foreign 
policy portfolio, the erosion of “regular order” on these committees sapped their capacity to use 
transparency as an instrument of policy change, reflected in a major decline in hearings on both 
committees in the mid-1990s.  
 If institutional change matters to committees’ use of oversight tools, so too do 
committees’ own stable institutional identities. Not all committees are predisposed to use 
transparency as a policy tool in the same way. The culture of the Armed Services Committee was 
one that restricted partisan policy conflict, focusing instead on expanding the Pentagon’s budget. 
Its members circled the wagons around Republican presidents and used hearings to prop up 
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public confidence in the military. The result was that Armed Services did not engage in regular 
oversight, except after major military deployments or other policy incidents such as the 
revelation of appalling health conditions at Walter Reed Army Hospital in 2007. By contrast, 
Foreign Relations developed a more robust culture of policy debate in which majority leaders 
used the committee to enhance their party’s reputation. As a result, the committee tended to 
exercise greater oversight during periods of divided government—in particular when Democratic 
leadership faced a Republican president—and on issues that accentuated policy failures of the 
President’s party. For example, despite the comparatively small national-security stakes of US 
involvement in the 1992 humanitarian crisis in Somalia, Democratic leaders on Foreign 
Relations used the incident to exploit the George H.W. Bush’s failure to commit troops to attack 
Republicans’ competence in foreign policy.  
 In exchange for tightly focusing its analysis on two committees over time, Fowler’s study 
affords a level of precision on the politics of oversight that prior studies have lacked. In 
particular, Watchdogs suggests that transparency-promoting institutions like oversight 
committees are in many ways only as effective as the incentives for discretionary policymakers 
to use them. The increasing challenge of investing in oversight is not unique to congressional 
committees. Recently, congressional budget cuts to Offices of inspectors general (OIGs) have 
limited the kinds of audits, investigations, and other enforcement actions that allow government 
to ensure the effective spending of money and to avoid misappropriation of funds (Hudak and 
Wallack 2015). So while the demand for oversight must be balanced with other policy goals, 
greater attention is warranted to how fiscal and professional realities affect policymakers’ desire 
to serve as monitors. As Fowler shows, we cannot ignore the difficulty of oversight in the face of 
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legislative agendas, policy commitments, and professional incentives out of joint with the cause 
of transparency.  
 
TRANSPARENCY CULTURE AND ITS DISCONTENTS   
While government watchdogs are significant, the implementation of transparency reforms is not 
simply a matter for professionals or policy elites. A core assumption of the open-government 
philosophy is that the state can leverage the public itself as an instrument of policy change. By 
opening up market or government activity to public scrutiny, transparency reforms seek to 
improve the likelihood that citizens will become mobilized to address significant policy 
problems. Budget transparency programs, for example, seek to allow “citizens to play a key role 
in identifying, discussing, and prioritizing public spending projects” (Open Government 
Partnership 2013: 10). Other measures—food-labeling or physician-rating initiatives, for 
instance—target consumers in the hope that they will use information to make more informed 
choices in the marketplace.  
Given the public’s important role in transparency reforms, the Obama Administration has 
made it a priority for government agencies to “identify key audiences” for their data and to 
“endeavor to publish high-value information for each of those audiences in the most accessible 
forms and formats” (Obama 2009). In an information-rich world, however, voters and consumers 
may still lack the resources, time, or taste for using the information that transparency initiatives 
produce (Lee et al. 2014). Moreover, what historian Michael Schudson calls the “culture of 
transparency” —defined by a public preference for information and institutionalized practices of 




Schudson’s The Rise of the Right to Know shows that we cannot understand the politics 
of transparency in the United States without appreciating the role of public culture. Most 
importantly, Schudson finds that the idea of transparency itself is a fairly recent entry in the 
democratic lexicon. The language of disclosure was largely missing from American politics prior 
to 1945. Yet in the early days of the cold war, prominent journalist groups—including the 
American Society of Newspaper Editors—began to invoke the idea of a quasi-constitutional 
“right to know.” This idea became essential to future political efforts to shed sunlight on the 
federal bureaucracy, food production processes, and industrial pollution.  
While US transparency reforms such as FOIA and the National Environmental Protection 
Act were the product of specific political disputes, often between Congress and the Executive 
Branch, they helped to underwrite the development of public-interest law firms, consumer 
groups, and environmental organizations, many of which began to use new government-provided 
information as the basis for political activism. Law itself is hardly the most important actor in the 
story, however. Rather, the effectiveness of transparency reforms also depended on changes in 
American culture, such as the rapid growth in college attendance by a more diverse cross-section 
of individuals and a strengthened focus on “critical inquiry” among educational institutions. 
Changing professional norms, especially among a journalistic corps increasingly skeptical of 
established elites, are also well documented in Schudson’s account.  
Public appreciation of transparency was a necessary but insufficient condition for 
effective policy change, however. Schudson cites a review of the first decade of the Fair 
Packaging and Labeling Act that suggested persistent confusion among consumers about product 
packaging standards and requirements for the “open dating” of foods. Indeed, consumer-oriented 
reforms may score fewer points in the absence of a well-educated consumer base.  
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Thus to say that we are still living in the “Sunshine Era”—saturated with the culture of 
transparency and reforms aimed at promoting it—is not to admit that transparency is always an 
effective policy tool. Nor, as Schudson notes in his conclusion, is transparency universally 
accepted as a public good. Within minutes of the launch of the federal government’s Physician 
Compare website in 2015, which enabled consumers to see doctors’ performance on routine 
screenings and preventive care for chronic conditions, the American Medical Association 
snapped back that the data would “lead consumers to draw faulty inferences about the quality of 
care that an individual physician or group provides” (Evans 2015). For the AMA, as for other 
professional groups, the opposite of transparency is not always secrecy; rather, it is the judgment 
of professionals, whose reputation is conditioned on social trust. Indeed, as Schudson 
acknowledges, the ideology of transparency continues to sit uneasily with professional beliefs 
about when and where the release of information is appropriate. Thus the social transformation 
documented in The Rise of the Right to Know is incomplete. Nevertheless, as the efforts of the 
Obama administration suggest, shifts in public culturehave made transparency a concept worthy 
of presidential energy. 
 
TURNING OUT THE LIGHTS  
If Schudson is right about the endurance of skepticism towards transparency, then studying the 
implementation of open-government policies is not enough. By focusing on “Sunshine Laws” 
themselves, we miss other trends in public policy that cut in the opposite direction, restricting 
and controlling the flow of information in a way that undermines the goals of “open 
government” and democratic deliberation. In Legislating in the Dark, James M. Curry shows 
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how policymakers restrict access to information—rather than expand it—in order to shape public 
policy.  
Just as transparency reformers seek to open up the policymaking process to new 
participants, Curry argues that party leaders in the House of Representatives have strong 
incentives to limit access to information about the content of legislation that might elicit 
controversy. Information about the content of bills under consideration is an especially valuable 
commodity in the House, where rank-and-file members have little time to become experts on 
most policy topics, and have little access to resources that allow them to analyze legislation on 
the agenda. Party leaders have become information “vendors,” developing legislative summaries 
and talking points that “sell” features of the legislation that will be particularly appetizing to the 
rank-and-file.   
Studying the process of information control is not easy. For obvious reasons, the decision 
to restrict information about legislation is itself a low-visibility affair. Tactics are developed 
behind closed doors and are rarely spoken about in public. As such, Curry’s empirical strategy 
relies on participant observation, based on the author’s extended periods of time as a 
congressional staffer, as well as interviews with policy elites and quantitative analyses of major 
legislation introduced between 1999 and 2010. As a result of this shoe-leather political science, 
Curry is able to identify and analyze fresh empirical patterns—well known to actors “on the 
ground” in Congress, but absent from scholarly debates. In Chapter 3, Curry shows how party 
leaders collect information about members’ policy preferences and use this information to 
structure how they frame legislation. With this information, members develop memoranda and 
legislative summaries that “package” their priority legislation. For example, in descriptive 
memos supporting legislation that would ensure a negative assessment of ethanol by the 
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Environmental Protection Agency, Republican leaders framed the bill to members as non-
controversial legislation, designed to ensure that the agency did due scientific diligence before 
approving the use of ethanol.    
Armed with a nuanced qualitative understanding of leadership-driven information 
control, Curry systematically examines 518 important bills for evidence of these tactics. In 29.5 
percent of these cases, parties used a “restricted layover” tactic, in which the full text of 
legislation is made available to members for 24 hours or less before a floor vote. For 19.5 
percent of the bills in Curry’s data set, party leaders used the tactic of “self-execution,” in which 
the House Rules Committee alters the contents of legislation through a procedural vote before a 
bill is considered on the floor. Finally, in 12.7 percent of the bills, party leaders significantly 
increased the complexity of legislation—often through creating massive omnibus bills or stuffing 
legislation with technical jargon. Party leaders use all of these tactics with greater frequency on 
legislation they consider a high priority, especially when organized interests and multiple 
congressional committees are attentive to a bill. 
How does the restriction of information shape public policy? It empowers partisan elites. 
When party leaders “turn out the lights,” Curry shows that roll call votes divide more sharply 
along party lines. By restricting information, party leaders limit the ability of rank-and-file 
members to analyze the content of legislation and assess its proximity to their own preferences. 
These tactics thus result in more responsible parties, yet they also limit input from rank and file 
members—and potentially constituents—on the content of legislation. Whatever normative 
conclusions one might draw from Legislating in the Dark, this book powerfully shows how 
information shapes the substance of public policy and the quality of democratic representation in 
the United States.  
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PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE AS PUBLIC POLICY?  
Transparency advocates often assume that better access to information empowers government 
watchdogs, voters, and consumers to shape public policy. This view is premised on a belief in 
unorganized individuals’ ability to process or aggregate information, or in government’s 
willingness and capacity to translate information in ways that can be easily acted upon. For those 
who hold this belief, the books discussed here suggest a wide array of options to improve the 
“effectiveness” of transparency tools—from ensuring that officials charged with oversight have 
appropriate incentives and applying appropriate punishments for violating disclosure laws to 
designing transparency programs with a better sensitivity to how information will be used. 
Yet these books also give us reason to doubt that transparency is the wide, well-paved, 
and toll-free road out of contemporary policy dilemmas that its most vociferous advocates claim. 
As transparency has risen to prominence as a policy instrument, a series of new political disputes 
emerged over what information may be public, in what form, to whom, and at whose discretion.  
These disputes carry three important lessons. First, the implementation of open 
government depends on legislative and bureaucratic infrastructures that were not built with 
transparency in mind. Those affected by the reforms also tend to find clever workarounds. To 
address these governance gaps, we need to better understand how government organizations 
enact new material practices of transparency, and why these practices sometimes fail to take hold 
(Worthy 2015). Second, transparency measures appear to require healthy public appetites for 
information, despite persistent voter and consumer myopia. As such, we need to know more 
about how publics become more effectively enrolled in the implementation of open government. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, given the limits of transparency as a policy instrument, 
we need to think more carefully about the political conditions of its use—especially as an 
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alternative to formal regulatory or economic incentives. Under what conditions, and with what 
coalitions, is transparency more than a cosmetic “show of doing something”? And when can 
policymakers enhance the effectiveness of disclosure by hitching it to other policy tools? With 
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